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Is it the Law or the Lawyers? 
 










 This paper introduces a new dataset from 50 private investment funds from 17 
countries around the world.  We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants 
imposed by institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund 
managers in areas pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of 
investments, fund operations, and limitations on liability.  We control for relations between 
the use of fund covenants and institutional factors such as offshore fund structures, as well as 
fund specific variables such as fund size, industry market-book, and the identity of the fund’s 
investors, among other control variables available in the rich and detailed new data introduced 
herein.  The data do indicate a role for country legality in affecting the frequency of use of 
fund covenants.  But the data further indicate that the presence of legally trained managers 
has a more pronounced role in affecting the use of covenants.  Overall, therefore, the lawyers 
appear to be more responsible than the law for the presence of the covenants that govern 
private investment funds across countries. 
 
 
Keywords:  Empirical Contracts; Private Equity; Law and Finance 
 





 Private equity and venture capital funds [hereafter “private investment funds”] are 
financial intermediaries between intuitional investors and entrepreneurial firms.  Private 
investment funds are often set-up as limited partnerships with the use of very long-term 
contracts that typically last for 10 to 13 years.  The institutional investors are the limited 
partners not involved in the day-to-day operation of the fund; the fund managers are the 
general partner.  Institutional investors impose covenants on the general partners in order to 
mitigate the agency problems associated with the investment of the institutional investors’ 
capital.  The covenants are privately negotiated between the institutional investors and fund 
managers in a way that efficiently manages the incentives and controls the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour among the fund managers.  This type of flexible investment fund 
structure has been heralded as a paramount reason for the success of the US venture capital 
industry (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1996, 1999, 2001a,b; Lerner and Schoar, 
2004a). 
 
 While there has been much research on the relations between private investment fund 
managers and their investee entrepreneurial firms in both theoretical1 and empirical studies2, 
there has been a comparative dearth of evidence on agency problems and contracts between 
private investment funds and their institutional investors. This is surprising, given the 
paramount importance of fund structures to understanding private equity and venture capital 
finance (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001).  To date, there have only been 
three empirical studies, and each is derived from data exclusively from the US (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996; Lerner and Schoar, 2002; Litvak, 2004).  Private investment fund structures in 
different countries, however, have not been the focus of much scrutiny.  In one study with 
international comparisons, Mayer et al. (2004) show different sources of funds affect the way 
in which funds are invested which is suggestive of different fund structures and restrictive 
covenants in different countries; however, that study does not explicitly consider how fund 
structures differ internationally.  Overall, while evidence is suggestive that fund structures are 
likely to differ in different countries, there  has been no empirical analysis of the differences 
in fund structures in different countries outside the US.  In the spirit of empirical work 
                                                 
     1 See, e.g., Bigus (2002, 2004), Bascha and Walz (2001a), Bergmann and Hege (1998), Berger 
and Udell (1998); Kirilenko (2001); Casamatta (2003), Neus and Walz (2004), Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg (2003, 2004), Keuschnigg (2004a,b), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001, 2003a,b, 2004a,b). 
     2 See, e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991); Gompers (1995, 1998), Gompers and Lerner (1999, 
2000, 2001a,b), Lerner (1994a,b, 1999), Bascha and Walz (2001b), Hsu (2004); Schwienbacher (2002); 
Hege et al. (2003). 
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comparing private equity and venture capital investment across countries,3 this paper 
investigates how and why private investment fund structures differ internationally. 
 
 Our empirical approach in this paper is similar in spirit to the seminal work of 
Gompers and Lerner (1996).  We focus on contractual covenants imposed by institutional 
investors on fund managers in the operation of venture capital funds.  We further consider 
funds that might more broadly be classified as “private equity” due to international 
differences in fund investment stage definitions and the differences in adherence of focus to 
specific stages stated by the funds.  As indicated, therefore, hereafter we simply refer to all of 
these funds as “private investment funds”.  This international comparison of contractual 
covenants among private investment funds across countries is the first empirical study of its 
kind. 
 
 We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by institutional 
investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas pertaining to 
investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations, and 
limitations on liability.  We introduce a new dataset hand-collected from 50 funds from 17 
countries including developed and emerging markets (Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cayman 
Islands, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherland Antilles, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK and the US.). 
 
 Our central hypothesis is that the frequency of covenants is influenced by the quality 
of law of the country in which the fund is legally registered.  On one hand, we might expect 
that countries with weaker laws have funds which make use of more covenants in order to 
substitute for the poor legal protections otherwise afforded to the parties.  On the other hand, 
we might expect the legal certainty offered by countries with superior law quality gives rise to 
a greater benefit/cost of negotiating and implementing covenants governing funds. 
 
 Our related central hypothesis is that the frequency of covenants is influenced by the 
presence of legally trained fund managers.  Each institutional investor contributing capital to 
a fund will have legal counsel that reviews the covenants pertaining to the setup of a fund.  
Likewise, the fund itself will have legal counsel the review the covenants.  We would expect 
the marginal impact of the presence of a lawyer among the fund managers, however, to be 
quite significant since the manager will be directly attuned to the meaning and importance of 
each of the fund covenants through his/her legal training, and because these rights and 
                                                 
     3 See, e.g., Jeng and Wells (2000), Manigart et al. (2002), Lockett and Wright (2002), Wright et 
al. (2002); Mayer et al. (2004); Lerner and Schoar (2004a,b). 
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obligations will directly influence the day-to-day job rights and responsibilities of the fund 
manager. 
 
 The data indicate mixed support for the two main hypotheses in the paper by that the 
presence of a legally trained fund manager increases the probability of the use of covenants, 
and the quality of law affects the use of covenants across countries.  First, regarding the 
quality of the rule of law and related factors pertinent to the legality of a country, we observe 
a statistically significant positive relation between the quality of a country’s laws and the 
number of covenants pertaining to fund operations (such as the sale of fund interests, 
restrictions on fundraising, and matters pertaining to public disclosure).  An increase in the 
Legality index from 20 to 21 (a typical improvement among developed nations) increases the 
probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation by approximately 1%, whereas 
an increase from 10 to 11 (a typical improvement among emerging markets) increases the 
probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation by approximately 2%.  The data 
further indicate that civil law countries are approximately 6% more likely to have covenants 
pertaining to the types of investment; however, the common/civil law differences were not 
notable for any other type of covenant. 
 
 Second, with respect to legally trained fund managers, an increase in one fund 
manager of five with legal training increases the probability of additional covenants 
pertaining both to investment decisions (such as the size of any single investment and co-
investment) and types of investment (in different asset classes) by approximately 10%.  Taken 
together, therefore, while law and lawyers are both important, the presence of lawyers has a 
more economically significant impact on the use of covenants than the legal environment 
itself. 
 
 Third, it is noteworthy that a number of control variables indicate a significant 
influence on the probability of use of covenants.  In particular, our analyses show an 
important relation between fund covenants and institutional factors such as offshore fund 
structures, as well as fund specific variables such as fund size, industry market-book, and the 
identity of the fund’s investors.  In particular, offshore funds have fewer covenants; larger 
funds have more covenants; funds that operate in industries with higher market/book ratios 
have more covenants; and funds with more experienced managers are more likely to be 
granted limited liability protections for the fund managers.  It is also noteworthy that in times 
of stronger market conditions, institutional investors are more likely to grant limited liability 
protection to fund managers.  There are other significant factors that we identify in the rich 
and detailed new data introduced herein. 
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It is perhaps noteworthy that our analyses are somewhat related to international 
studies of differences in contract terms written between private funds and entrepreneurial 
firms (Lerner and Schoar, 2004b); however, our focus is not on contracts with entrepreneurs, 
but rather, we focus on contracts between institutional investors and the fund managers.  This 
difference is significant for a number of reasons.  First, contracts in the establishment of funds 
are much longer term (typically at least 10 years) than those written between fund managers 
and entrepreneurs, and cannot be altered over time.  Second, the types of contracts studied 
here determine the overall structure of the private investment fund and not merely the 
assignment of rights and responsibilities among the fund managers and a single investee of 
the fund.  Because fund structures have been heralded as determinative of the success of the 
US venture capital industry (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), and because there are massive 
differences in the size and success of venture capital markets across countries (see, e.g., Black 
and Gilson, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000), prior work suggests it is important and worthwhile 
to study international differences in fund structures. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the theory and hypotheses.  The 
new data used to test the hypotheses are introduced in section 3.  Empirical tests are presented 
in section 4.  Limitations and alternative explanations are considered in section 5.  The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 In this section we first describe the types of restrictive covenants in private 
investment funds, and the rationale for such covenants, in subsection 2.1.  The relation 
between the legal and institutional environment and fund covenants is considered in 
subsection 2.2.  Subsection 2.3 considers human capital factors in influencing fund covenants.  
Thereafter we discuss a variety of control variables in subsection 2.4.  The data and empirical 
tests follow in subsections 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
2.1. Types of Restrictive Covenants 
 
 Venture capital and private equity funds are financial intermediaries between 
institutional investors (such as banks, endowments, pension funds, life insurance companies, 
wealthy private individuals) and private entrepreneurial firms.  Institutional investors do not 
have the time and skills to carry out due diligence in selecting worthy entrepreneurial firms 
for financing, and carry out the monitoring and value-added advice to bring investments in 
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small and medium sized enterprises to fruition (the investment process in an entrepreneurial 
firm can take between 2-7 years before an exit event such as an IPO, acquisition or write-off).  
Institutional investors therefore commit capital to venture capital and private equity funds so 
that specialized fund managers can manage the investment process in entrepreneurial firms. 
 
The most common form of organization of venture capital and private equity funds in 
the US has been a limited partnership structure that typically lasts for 10 years, with an option 
to continue for an additional 3 years to ensure the investments have been brought to fruition 
and the fund can be wound up (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1996, 1999).  Other 
countries around the world that allow limited partnership structures have likewise made use of 
such structures.4  Countries that do not allow limited partnership structures have made use of 
corporate forms that closely resemble limited partnerships in the covenants governing the 
partnership.5 
 
 Limited partnerships and similar forms of organization involve an assignment of 
rights and responsibilities in the form of a very long term contract over a period of 10 or more 
years.  The purpose of this contract is to mitigate the potential for agency problems associated 
with the venture capital managers’ investing institutional investor capital in private 
entrepreneurial firms.  The massive potential for agency problems in the reinvestment of 
capital (elaborated below), and the very long term nature of the limited partnership contract, 
make extremely important the assignment of rights and obligations in the contract in the form 
of restrictive covenants.  The characteristics of these restrictive covenants among funds in 
different countries around the world are the focus of this study. 
 
 In this paper we group the venture capital fund restrictive covenants into five 
categories, as follows.  We formed four of the categories of covenants on the basis of 
Gompers and Lerner (1996). We have however made changes to those four categories to take 
into account new types of covenants more commonly used now and to include covenants 
relating to the limitation of the fund manager’s liability. We have also made changes that 
reflect the structure of funds in non-US countries, where funds may be organised in various 
legal forms. The changes were made with  advice provided by a VC practitioner (specifically, 
the head legal advisor of a venture capital fund in Malaysia), and we confirmed the 
                                                 
     4 For example, for funds in Europe, see www.evca.com.  
     5 Australia, for example, has only allowed limited partnerships since 2003; prior to that time 
funds were set up as trusts, but functionally these trusts involved rights and responsibilities that 
mimicked the limited partnership structure; see Cumming et al. (2005).  
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appropriateness of the categorizations based on interviews with six fund managers at nine 
different funds in three different countries.  
 
Category 1: Authority of Fund Manager Regarding Investment Decisions 
 The restrictions on investment decisions limit the agency problems associated with 
the investment of the institutional investor’s capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1996).  This is 
important, since the institutional investors cannot (as limited partners they are legally 
prohibited from interfering, otherwise they lose their limited liability status) interfere with the 
day-to-day operations of the fund.  These restrictions include, first, restrictions on the size of 
investment in any one portfolio company because otherwise a fund manager might lower his 
or her effort costs associated with diversifying the institutional investors’ capital across a 
number of different entrepreneurial firms.6  Second, there are restrictions on the ability of a 
fund manager to borrow money such as in the form of bank debt and reinvest that borrowed 
money alongside the institutional investors’ capital.  That type of behaviour would increase 
the leverage of the fund and increase the risks faced by the institutional investors.  Third, 
there are restrictions on co-investment by another fund managed by the fund manager, as well 
as restrictions on co-investment by the fund investors.  Those restrictions limit the conflicts of 
interest in the allocation of opportunities to different institutional investors of the fund, as 
well as limit the incentive by a fund manager to bail out the poor performing investments of a 
companion fund operated by the same manager.  Fourth, there are restrictions on the re-
investment of capital gains obtained from investments brought to fruition.  Some fund 
managers might otherwise pursue a strategy of “fame not fortune” in terms of trying to get as 
many IPO successes as possible, at the expense of a risk of losing the profits of one 
investment into a new unproven venture. Fifth, there are restrictions on the overall ability and 
independence of the fund manager to make investment decisions.  Finally, there are other less 
common covenants on other types of investment and divestment decisions (such as limits in 
terms of timing of investment with drawdowns, and timing of exits).7 
 
Category 2: Restrictions on Fund Manager’s Investment Powers 
 The covenants in the class of restrictions on investment powers also limit the agency 
problems in the separation of ownership (i.e., by the institutional investors) and control (i.e., 
by the fund managers) in the investment process.  The first restriction in this class involves 
co-investment of the Fund Managers themselves.  This is similar to co-investment by the 
                                                 
     6 Note, however, in some cases funds are set up in a way that enables such restrictions to be 
waived upon approval of all the investors. 
     7 Waiver of these covenants may also be subject to approval of the Fund’s Board of Advisors, 
which usually comprises institutional fund investors. 
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fund’s institutional investors and co-investment of prior funds (as described above in 
Category 1), but instead involves the personal funds of the Fund Managers.  This restriction 
limits the incentive problems associated with the allocation of attention by the fund managers 
to different entrepreneurial firms in the fund portfolio.  If the fund manager were able to co-
invest personal funds, there would be distorted incentives for the fund manager to spend the 
most of their time allocating effort to the firms in which the manager is personally invested, 
instead of trying to maximize the value of the overall portfolio (as would be expected by 
intuitional investors).  Second, there are covenants pertaining to the sale of fund interests by 
the fund managers, since the institutional investors financial interest will be compromised by 
the addition of new institutional investors, and more significantly the loss of commitment of 
the fund manager who is usually also the general partner or most active fund shareholder.  
Third, key person provisions and limits of the additions of investment principals regarding the 
fund managers, since the contract is made with specific fund managers and the institutional 
investors do want the management of their capital to be in the hands of specific people with 
whom they have contracted.  Finally, there could be other types of restrictions on other 
actions of fund managers. 
 
Category 3: Covenants Relating to the Types of Investment 
 Covenants pertaining to the types of investment ensure that the institutional investors’ 
capital is invested in a way that is consistent with their desired risk/return profile.  
Restrictions include investments in other venture funds, follow on investments in portfolio 
companies of other funds of the fund manager,8 public securities, leveraged buyouts, foreign 
securities, and bridge financing.  Without such restrictions, the fund manager could pursue 
investment strategies that better suit the interests of the fund managers regardless of the 
interests of the institutional investors. 
 
Category 4: Fund Operation 
 Covenants on fund operation are designed to oversee the administrative aspects of a 
fund, and include the sale of fund interests by fund investors9, restrictions against the fund 
manager on raising a new fund,10 public disclosure of fund matters to investors, and 
provisions to allow fund investors to vote to remove the fund manager without cause (no fault 
divorce clauses). The covenant restricting the sale of fund interest by fund investors (in this 
                                                 
     8 This is similar to the co-investment restriction in category 1, but  where the category 1 
restriction is against another fund managed by the fund manager investing in the fund, this restriction in 
category 3 is against the fund itself investing in another fund’s (usually an earlier fund) portfolio 
company, also managed by the fund manager . 
     9 In category 2, we identified a similar covenant on sale of fund interests by fund managers. 
     10 This restriction on fundraising is typically either for a set period of time or hurdle rate. 
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category 4) is differentiated from the covenant restricting the sale of interest by fund manager 
(as specified in category 2) because the specific fund manager action of selling pertains to 
things fund managers cannot do, whereas this category 4 pertains to administrative aspects of 
all investors. Recall that the fund manager is also the general partner or most active 
shareholder of a fund, unlike all other fund investors; hence, the different categorizations for 
seemingly related actions.  
 
Category 5: Limitation of Liability of the Fund Manager 
 While categories 1-4 considered covenants constraining the activities of fund 
managers, this last category of covenants pertains to favourable awards of limited liability for 
the fund managers.  Fund manager liability can be limited in the event of disappointing 
returns from investments made, limited if the fund manager fails to investment committed 
capital within the agreed time, and/or limited if the fund manager is found to be mismanaging 
the fund. 
 
 In the remaining subsections of section 2 we conjecture how the frequency of use of 
these covenants varies by the fund’s legal and institutional environment, the human capital of 
the fund, and various other variables that might plausibly impact the use of fund covenants. 
 
2.2. Legal and Institutional Environment 
 
One source of international differences in venture capital markets is most likely 
attributable to the impact of laws and institutions on venture capital governance structures.  
Our central hypothesis is that the frequency of covenants is influenced by the quality of law 
of the country in which the fund is legally registered.  There are two competing hypotheses.  
On one hand, we might expect that countries with weaker laws have funds which make use of 
more covenants in order to substitute for the poor legal protections otherwise afforded to the 
parties.  On the other hand, we might expect the legal certainty offered by countries with 
superior law quality gives rise to a greater benefit/cost of negotiating and implementing 
covenants governing funds.  We formally state these two competing hypotheses as follows. 
 
H1a: Higher rule of law indicies, and related legality factors, give rise to improved legal 
certainty and therefore a greater benefit/cost of negotiating and implementing 
covenants governing funds. 
 
H1b: Higher rule of law indicies, and related legality factors, give rise to fewer covenants 
as the need to substitute for poor country-wide legal protections diminishes. 
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We test H1a and H1b with the use of the “Legality” index.  The Legality index is a weighted 
average of the legal index variables introduced by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), as defined by 
Berkowitz et al. (2003).  The Legality index is a broad measure based on La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) which comprises civil versus common law systems, the efficiency of the judicial 
system, the rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, and 
shareholder rights (the Legality index is a weighted sum of the factors based on Berkowitz et 
al., 2003).  A higher Legality index indicates better substantive legal content pertaining to 
investing, the quality and likelihood of enforcement.  Higher numbers indicate ‘better’ legal 
systems across each of the factors.  Note that Legality in the context of fund structure 
appropriately refers to the laws of the country in which the fund was formed.  The Legality 
index values for the countries in our dataset are: Belgium (20.82), Brazil (14.09), Canada 
(21.13), Cayman Islands (20.41), Finland (21.49), Germany (20.44), Italy (17.23), 
Luxembourg (21.91), Malaysia (16.67), Netherland Antilles (21.67), the Netherlands (21.67), 
New Zealand (21.55), Philippines (8.51), South Africa (14.51), Switzerland (21.91), the UK 
(20.41) and the US (20.85).11 
 
 One component of international differences in laws not picked up by the Legality 
index is the civil versus common law difference.12  We might expect civil law countries to be 
more formalized about writing contracts in accord with a rule-based legal system, at least 
relative to common law countries. 
 
H2: Civil law countries have fund managers more inclined to be rule-based and write 
more covenants in fund contracts. 
 
 Finally, an interesting aspect of international differences in investment funds is that 
sometimes funds are setup “offshore”.  The institutional investors of such funds invariably 
come from a diverse array of countries.  We therefore expect differences in the frequency of 
covenants for such funds. 
 
                                                 
     11 These values are provided by Berkowitz et al. (2003).  For the Cayman Islands, the Legality 
index was not available.  As such, we inferred the value of the Legality index based on a regression 
model which used the GNP per capita of all countries around the world for which Legality is available.  
The correlation between GNP per capita and Legality around the world is extremely high at 
approximately 0.9. 
     12 More generally, there are legal origin differences focused on my La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); 
however, with the limited degrees of freedom in our dataset, we focus of the common versus civil law 
difference. 
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H3: Offshore funds involve institutional investors from a greater number of disparate 
countries, have greater negotiation and contracting costs, and therefore fewer 
covenants. 
 
 In addition to these legal environment variables, there are human capital factors and 
other fund- and market-specific variables that might affect the use of covenants, as discussed 
below. 
 
2.3. Human Capital Factors 
 
 Perhaps the most compelling idea pertaining to contract choice is that the human 
capital elements of the contracting parties determine the contract clauses.  In the context of 
private investment funds, the human capital of the fund managers unilaterally carrying out the 
day-to-day operations of the fund is what is relevant.  We first conjecture that the frequency 
of covenants is influenced by the presence of legally trained fund managers (as conjectured in 
Armour, 2004).  Each institutional investor contributing capital to a fund will have legal 
counsel that reviews the covenants pertaining to the setup of a fund.  Likewise, the fund itself 
will have legal counsel that review the covenants.  We would expect the marginal impact of 
the presence of each lawyer among the fund managers, however, to be quite significant since 
the managers will be directly attuned to the meaning and importance of each of the fund 
covenants through his/her legal training, and because these rights and obligations will directly 
influence the day-to-day job rights and responsibilities of the fund manager. 
 
H4: Legally trained fund managers write more covenants governing the activities of the 
fund. 
 
In testing H4, note that we also control for the presence of fund managers with MBA or CFA 
training, as well as distinguish between managers with a Ph.D. in either a scientific or non-
scientific discipline. 
 
 Our last hypothesis pertains to fund manager experience.  For the more experienced 
fund managers, we expect fewer restrictive covenants among more experienced fund 
managers, and more covenants granting limited liability to fund managers.  This prediction is 
based on the simple reasons that the bargaining power is greater among more experienced 




H5: Funds with more experienced managers will have fewer restrictive covenants, and 
more covenants granting limited liability protections for the fund managers.  
 
2.4. Control Variables 
 
 A number of other factors could reasonably be expected to influence the use of 
covenants.  First, larger funds might have more covenants if the contracting costs are worth 
bearing with an increase in the scale of the fund.  Second, funds that operate in industries with 
higher market/book ratios, and among investees in their earlier stage of development, will 
have more covenants given the risks and scope for opportunistic behaviour are more 
pronounced.  Third, in stronger market conditions, institutional investors might be more likely 
to acquiesce fewer covenants to the fund managers and grant limited liability protection to 
fund managers if the supply of funds from institutional investors to private equity and venture 
capital exceeds the talent available in the market for managing these funds.  Finally, the type 
of institutional investors and the year in which the fund was formed may also be relevant 




3.1. Methods and Survey Instrument 
 
The data assembled for this paper are derived primarily from a survey of private 
equity funds across the developed and emerging private equity markets carried out between 
July 2004 and December 2004. This method of data collection was deemed the most efficient 
way to obtain the information we required to test our hypotheses for various reasons. Whilst 
there are various publications providing both quantitative and qualitative information as 
provided by private equity fund managers from mainly developed private equity markets,13 
detailed information on the covenants used by both fund investors and fund managers to 
regulate their relationships is almost never made public. Also, as the agreements used to 
govern the relationship between fund investors and fund manager may not necessarily be in 
English, the language common to us, we felt it best to allow the fund managers themselves to 
provide the data related to such agreements in a manner that was readable to us. Finally, in 
view of the fact that the funds surveyed will be subject to different laws, thus affecting the 
format and literal content of such agreements, we felt it would be far more efficient to allow 
the fund managers, as those bound by the terms of the agreements, to provide the information 
                                                 
     13 See, e.g., www.evca.com for European data. 
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regarding the relevant covenants governing, or more specifically, restricting their investment 
decisions. These publications and other information obtained from respondents’ websites 
were however used to verify and enhance data obtained by the survey. 
 
The instrument we used to obtain detailed data about the structure of funds across 
both developed and emerging private equity markets is a 9 page questionnaire, comprising 24 
questions. Robustness is achieved chiefly by framing questions in a way that calls for numeric 
responses, or a simple “yes” or “no” response. In view of the fact that the potential 
respondents are from both developed and emerging private equity markets across the world, a 
glossary of terms was provided in the survey to ensure uniformity in defining terms which 
may not necessarily be used in the same manner across markets.    
 
The survey questions were organised in 4 parts. First, information about the 
organization of both the funds and the fund management firms was sought. Fund managers 
were asked to indicate the legal organizational types of both the fund and the management 
firm, including fund size, vintage year, life of fund, investment period, the number and terms 
of any allowable extensions, and the composition of fund investors. The managers were also 
asked to include a breakdown of the composition of fund investors indicating the number of 
foreign investors, and the percentage of capital provided by equity, loans or guarantees. Other 
fund characteristics such as whether the funds are deemed as onshore or offshore funds, with 
differentiation made between outbound offshore and inbound offshore, were also asked to be 
indicated. Second, details on investment strategy including regional focus, investment stage 
or type of allowable financing, and more importantly industry composition of fund 
investments were sought from the managers. Third, information was sought on the type of 
agreements used to govern the relationship between the investors and the fund manager, 
including detailed information about the covenants relating to fund and management 
restrictions. Managers are asked to indicate the extent of the limitation of their liabilities as 
provided by the agreements. The questionnaire also addressed the issue of fund governance, 
requesting respondents to indicate the composition of the fund board of advisors or directors, 
the composition of the fund scientific or technical advisory board, and more importantly the 
extent of their influence over investment decisions. Finally, fund managers were required to 
indicate the average number of relevant work experience years of the principal fund managers 
in the management firm at the time of fund raising and the proportion of the team with 
MBA/CFA degrees, Law degrees, and Ph.Ds in both scientific and non-scientific disciplines.  
The data we have compiled provide a unique set of variables, which are summarised and 
defined in Table 1. 
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[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
3.2. Potential Sample Selection Bias 
 
The potential respondents were identified from various sources including, but not 
limited to the following: 
 
1. The Galante Database of Venture Capital and Private Equity Firms 2003; 
2. Regional venture capital and private equity associations such as the European 
Venture Capital Association and the Asia Pacific Venture Capital Alliance;  
3. National venture capital and private equity associations; and 
4. Firm and Fund web sites. 
 
Pursuant to identifying the appropriate contact persons, the survey instrument was sent to 
approximately 1000 venture capital fund management firms worldwide. Participation was 
chiefly solicited with the promise that the aggregated survey results would be disseminated to 
respondents. Only one questionnaire was sent to any target fund management firm and was 
addressed only to senior venture capital and private equity fund managers. 
 
One limitation to obtaining data through a survey is the possibility of sample 
selection bias. While we acknowledge that this is a possibility, we believe from a detailed 
analysis of the responses received and the data obtained form the responses that this concern 
does not arise in this exercise.  First, survey data were gathered for a final sample of 50 funds 
in 17 countries, as managed by 50 fund managers in 21 countries. We are aware that the 
seminal work carried out by Gompers and Lerner (1996) utilised a sample of 140 contracts 
used to establish funds, and obtained from instuitutional investors (two fund of funds and one 
endowment). Litvak (2004) has data from 38 funds in the US.  We believe however that by 
obtaining data from funds situated both in and outside the US, and by having access to data 
regarding contracts entered into by 21 different fund managers, response bias is mitigated as 
much as possible.  Limitations in our sample size from each country from which we derived 
data, as well as the limited information about venture capital and private equity funds around 
the world, however, makes reliable statistical comparisons of our sample relative to the 
population of funds intractable. Our sample of respondent funds includes 8 funds each the 
Netherlands and the US, 6 funds each from the UK and Malaysia, 4 funds from the 
Netherlands Antilles, 3 funds each from Germany and Belgium, 2 funds each from the 
Cayman Islands and South Africa, and 1 fund each Philippines, Canada, Finland, New 
Zealand, Luxembourg, Brazil, Switzerland, and Italy (see Table 2). The respondent fund 
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managers include 7 each from the Netherlands, Malaysia and the Netherlands, 6 from the US, 
3 each from the UK and Germany, 2 each from Belgium and South Africa, and 1 each from 
the Philippines, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Brazil, Italy, Vietnam, the Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Norway, France, South Korea and Uzbekistan. The number of respondents, and the 
fair representation of both funds from developed and emerging private equity markets, make a 
response bias even less likely. 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
Secondly, a broad array of respondents replied to the survey.  For example, the data 
show the median respondent fund size of US$39,487,200 and the average being 
US$103,974,889 (minimum US$263,378; maximum US$482,766,000), indicating 
respondents were of a variety of fund sizes and of typical size for a sample of non-US 
countries.14 The possibility of sample selection bias is further reduced by the presence of both 
onshore and offshore funds within the final sample, the presence of funds organized not only 
in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, but also within jurisdictions in legal systems 
with English, French, Scandinavian and German based legal systems, and also the presence of 
funds situated in countries where English in not the primary language. 
 
Finally, a sufficient number of variables regarding both fund and fund manager 
organization and the relevant features of the fund asset size, fund vintage, investor 
composition, investment strategy, industry composition of fund investments and governance 
structures, more specifically the specific covenants provided in the terms within the 
agreements that govern the relationship between fund investors and fund manager, were 
collected to minimise the risk of response bias. We unfortunately realise that we cannot be 
absolutely rule out the possibility of a response bias as the data we have collected here is 
unique.  
 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 2, Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 About Here] 
 
                                                 
     14 For some comparative information on fund sizes among non-US funds, see, e.g., 
www.evca.com  
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The variables as set out in the Summary Statistics in Table 2 used to test our hypotheses are 
broken down into 4 main categories:  
 
1. Restrictive covenants (Investment decisions, Investment powers, types of investment, 
fund operation, limitation of manager liability, and sum of all covenants excluding 
limitation of manager liability); 
2. Legal and market conditions (country legality index, common law country, MSCI 
index, vintage year of fund, outbound offshore and inbound offshore); 
3. Fund manager characteristic (Percentage of legally trained fund managers, 
MBA/CFA trained fund managers, and Ph.d (science/non-science based disciplines) 
qualified fund managers within a team, and the average number of years of relevant 
work experience of principal fund managers); and 
4. Fund characteristics (Amount of funds raised, composition of fund investors (banking 
institutions and government bodies/agencies), organization as a Limited Partnership, 
Industry Market/Book ratio, and early stage investee focus).  
 
As the primary variables used to prove our hypotheses are within the first main 
category, they are further elaborated by Figure 1 which sets out the frequency of the use of 
each of the 5 sub-categories (not including the additional summation category set out in Table 
2), and Figure 2 which sets out the frequency of the use of each specific covenant within each 
sub-category (not including the summation category set out in Table 2).  Each variable is 
presented in 24 rows (28 in total) and 18 separate columns, one column representing the total 
sum or average of the total sum of the rest of the 17 columns, which represent each sample 
jurisdiction.     
 
The first row in Table 2 sets out the sum total of the sample set as 50 funds, with the 
sample of funds comprising 8 funds each the Netherlands and the US, 6 funds each from the 
UK and Malaysia, 4 funds from the Netherlands Antilles, 3 funds each from Germany and 
Belgium, 2 funds each from the Cayman Islands and South Africa, and 1 fund each 
Philippines, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Brazil, Switzerland, and Italy. The 
sample countries are listed alphabetically. 
 
Rows 3 to 6 in Table 2 set out the average frequency of the use of covenants within 
agreements governing the relationship between fund investors and fund manager, relating to 
investment decisions, investment powers, types of investment, and fund operation. Row 8 sets 
out the total average and sum of the 3 types of covenants used across markets. Row 7, 
although setting out a type of covenant relating to the limitation of liability of fund managers, 
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is not included in the sum of restrictive covenants as they essentially act to provide more 
latitude to fund managers in exercising their investment powers. From the data (as 
summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2), we are able to observe that the most commonly used 
covenant is that restricting the size of investments made by fund managers, while the least 
commonly used covenant is that which restricts co-investments by other fund investors. This 
is possibly due to the fact that investors seek to mitigate the fund’s investment risk by 
ensuring diversification of fund assets, minimizing downside risk. Co-investments by fund 
investors, on the other hand, will maximize investors’ upside potential.  We are also able to 
observe (from Table 2 and Figure 1) that funds on average do not utilize all of the possible 
restrictive covenants available to them, although they do utilize a majority of them.  It is for 
this reason that we seek to determine the importance of industry-specific factors in driving the 
use of covenants. 
 
To carry out our empirical analysis we use a second category of variables, Legal and 
market conditions, comprising primarily a country legality index (based on Berkowitz et al., 
2003; see also Table 1) which is a weighted average of following factors: civil versus 
common law systems, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights (as per La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998).  Of course the log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing 
effect with larger numbers in the multivariate analyses in section 4 below. To test for 
robustness, we also included variables such as the system of law within each sample country, 
the MSCI Index of the specific country for the year prior to the vintage year of the fund which 
is also provided. The year prior to fundraising is deemed to be most relevant as decisions to 
invest in private equity by institutional investors will be based on available economic 
indicators. Again, the log of (1+MSCI) is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing 
effect with larger numbers.  
 
To further test our hypotheses, a third category in Table 2 comprising variables on 
fund manager characteristic is provided to determine the extent the human capital factor 
affects the use of covenants.  The percentage of legally trained fund managers, MBA/CFA 
trained fund managers, Ph.d (science/non-science based disciplines) qualified fund managers 
within a team, and the average number of years of relevant work experience of principal fund 
managers are set out in Rows 17 to 21 of Table 2. From this data we are able to observe that a 
vast majority of fund managers have financial discipline backgrounds, with an MBA/CFA 
qualification, while less than 10% have advanced scientific degrees.  
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The final category in Table 2 provides variables regarding fund organization 
characteristics, including composition of investors and type of fund. Variables include the 
average sum of funds raised by all 50 funds, and the average of each jurisdiction represented. 
The proportion of banking institutions and government bodies within each fund, as averaged, 
is also set out. The proportion of funds organized as Limited Partnerships, the respective 
industry market/book ratio and the proportion of funds with an early stage investee focus is 
also included. 
 
Although we have set out the most relevant variables for the purposes of testing our 
hypotheses, there are other variables within the dataset which serve to confirm and augment 
the set of variables we have chosen here.  Additional variables not explicitly presented, as 
well as alternative specifications of the models below, are available upon request. 
 
3.4. Correlation Matrix 
 
 Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of the primary variables of interest.  The 
correlations provide preliminary insights into the relations between the hypothesized relations 
set out in section 2.  For instance, there are fewer covenants among common law countries, 
but more covenants among countries with higher legality indices.  Offshore funds tend to 
have fewer covenants.  Funds with a greater percentage of legally trained fund managers tend 
to have more covenants.  Funds that invest in companies operating in industries with higher 
market/book ratios have more covenants.  Tables 3 provides some other insights into the 
relations between other variables, as well as guidance for the potential for collinearity 
problems in the multivariate empirical tests provided in section 4 immediately below. 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here – Re Correlation Matrix] 
 
4. Econometric Tests 
 
 The econometric tests focus on the counts of the number of different covenants used 
within the five main categories enumerated above: investment decisions, investment powers, 
types of investment, fund operation, and limitation of liability.  For each of the categories 
separately, we use ordered logit models to consider the multivariate determinants of the use of 
covenants.  The ordered logits appropriately account for the fact that the dependent variable is 
ranked and takes a finite number of values.  We further consider the determinants of the sum 
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of covenants across the first four categories,15 and use standard OLS regressions for that 
dependent variable.16  For each of the six different dependent variables, we present three 
alternative specifications to show the robustness of the results to the included right-hand-side 
variables.  The explanatory variables include legal and market conditions, fund manager 
characteristics, and fund characteristics, as enumerated above (see section 3 and Table 1).  
Overall, there are 18 regression models presented (3 for the first category of fund covenants, 3 
for the second, etc., including the fifth category, and 3 for the sum of categories 1-4 of 
covenants).  The regression results are presented in Table 4.   
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
 In this section we describe both the statistical and economic significance of the 
results.  The standard logit and OLS regression coefficients are presented.  The marginal 
effects for the economic significance of the logit coefficients were computed separately 
(using Limdep Econometric Software), and are not reported in the tables for reasons of 
succinctness and tractability in presentation, but are nevertheless discussed below to highlight 
the economic significance of the results. 
 
The data provide some support for the hypothesized determinants of fund covenants 
across countries as outlined in section 2.  First, in respect of legality, the data indicate a 
statistically significant positive relation between the quality of a country’s laws and the 
number of covenants pertaining to fund operations (such as the sale of fund interests, 
restrictions on fundraising, and matters pertaining to public disclosure); see Models 10-12 in 
Table 4.  The legality variable is significant at the 10% level of significance in Models 10 and 
12, and at the 5% level in Model 11.  However, legality is not a statistically relevant variable 
for any of the other classes of dependent variables.17  In Models 10-12, the results indicate the 
legality variable is also economically significant.  For example, an increase in the Legality 
index from 20 to 21 (a typical improvement among developed nations) increases the 
probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation by approximately 1%, whereas 
                                                 
     15 We exclude the fifth category in the sum of all covenants since the fifth category is for limited 
liability and not negative covenants constraining behaviour. 
     16 Ordered logit models on more than 20 categories in the dependent variable are not tractable 
for a dataset with 50 observations; hence OLS was used in this last set of regressions.  Other 
specifications were considered, such as Poisson regression models, but did not improve the properties 
of the model given the distribution of the use of covenants across the funds (see Figure 1).  Alternative 
specifications are available upon request. 
     17 Legality is statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 16, but that result is not robust in 
Models 17 or 18. 
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an increase from 10 to 11 (a typical improvement among emerging markets) increases the 
probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation by approximately 2%. 
 
Overall, the data indicate support for H1a (and not H1b; see subsection 2.2) insofar as 
it relates to fund operation, but not the other classes of covenants.  It is perhaps not surprising 
that the legal environment most directly relates to fund operations, and not the other 
covenants on the activities of fund managers.  Covenants on fund operations such as 
disclosure and the removal of fund managers are enforced only in conjunction with the 
corporate laws in the country in which the fund has been set up.  This class of covenants is 
most directly related to the corporate governance of the fund administration.  The more 
specific covenants in the other categories pertain to the day-to-day activities of running the 
fund itself, and may or may not be used independently of the legal environment in which the 
fund has been set up. 
 
We next turn to the second hypothesis (H2), which pertains to common versus civil 
law countries.  To this end, we conjectured that the propensity to write rules would be more 
pronounced in rule based legal systems (civil law countries) as a matter of practice, and not a 
matter of legal substance.  The data do provide some support for this conjecture insofar as 
civil law countries are approximately 6% more likely to have each additional covenant 
pertaining to the types of investment (category 3; Models 8 and 9, the common law 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively).  At the same 
time, however, it is noteworthy that the common/civil law differences are not statistically 
significant for any other type of covenant; hence, the data only weakly support for H2. 
 
 Regarding H3, the data indicate offshore funds are about 10% less likely to have each 
covenant for the authority of the fund manager (Models 3) and the types of investment 
(Model 9).  This is consistent with our prediction, in so far as offshore funds involve a 
multitude of investors from different jurisdictions and contracting costs are therefore greater.  
These results might also be related to the fact that offshore funds are set up as they are more 
tax efficient for international investors who seek to take advantage of the profits to be made 
form emerging private equity markets as their own developed ones become over saturated. 
These international investors thus have less of a concern with the specific investment 
decisions made by the fund manager regarding types of investments carried out. For example, 
a few of the sample funds organised in Cayman Islands, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia (Labuan), and Netherlands Antilles are managed by fund managers situated in 
Vietnam, Czech Republic, Malaysia, and South Korea.  
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 Further to the issues in H3, note specifically that the results in Table 4 indicate that 
(1) outbound offshore funds have fewer covenants restricting the authority of the fund 
manager, and (2) inbound offshore funds have fewer restrictions for the types of investments 
made by the fund manager. An outbound offshore fund obtains its funds primarily from one 
jurisdiction, and invests its funds in a jurisdiction outside that of the fund jurisdiction and that 
of the primary investors. Conversely, an inbound offshore fund obtains its funds from 
investors in many jurisdictions, and invests its funds in a specific jurisdiction or region, 
sometimes including that of the fund jurisdiction and that of its investors. We have included 
the 2 categories of offshore funds, albeit an overly simplistic categorization, as in practice 
many funds combine attributes of each of the categories, to take into account the character of 
investors of offshore funds. By looking at the character of the offshore fund and the direction 
of investment fund inflow and outflow, we are able to see how they affect the use of 
covenants. Fewer covenants restricting the authority of the fund manager for outbound 
offshore funds may be related to the fact that the primary investors are more likely to share a 
common jurisdiction, and have similar levels of contracting costs. It has to be noted that there 
are numerous factors that fund managers consider in selecting a jurisdiction in which to 
organize an offshore fund. Given the likely target investor base, not only the tax laws of the 
fund’s jurisdiction is taken into account, but also those of the country in which potential 
investors reside, and of the country or region in which the fund may invest. Offshore fund 
jurisdictions also vary as to the degree of local regulation, the necessity of minimal contacts 
by the investors with the jurisdiction, the requirement for local fund administrators, forms of 
available corporate organizations, and quality of available legal and financial advice. When 
the primary investors are from one jurisdiction, it is easier for the fund manager to select the 
optimally beneficial jurisdiction for the primary investors, and as such the primary investors 
will have less issue with the corporate governance of the fund, or the authority of the fund 
manager over the fund. On the other hand, where the investors are dispersed, fund managers 
have difficulty in selecting an offshore jurisdiction as compromises will have to be made to 
achieve some sort of equilibrium amongst investors. Even factors such as the status and 
reputation of that potential jurisdiction within the financial community may be crucial as it 
will determine the number of treaties it is a party to, and thus the withholding taxes payable 
by investors. This compromise, and the high contracting costs related to reaching an 
agreement, may be related to our finding that inbound offshore funds have fewer restrictions 
for the types of investments made by the fund manager. The primary issue during the contract 
negotiation will not be the powers held by the fund manager in carrying out investments, but 
more the corporate governance issue related to the fund itself, being situated in a jurisdiction 
probably unfamiliar to many if not most of the investors, as all the investors come to an 
agreeable compromise.  
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 Regarding H4, with respect to legally trained fund managers, the data indicate that an 
increase in one fund manager of five (a 20% increase) with legal training increases the 
probability of additional covenants pertaining both to investment decisions (Category 1, 
including factors such as the size of any single investment and co-investment18) and types of 
investment (Category 3, for different asset classes) by approximately 10%.  The presence of 
legally trained fund managers, however, does not influence the frequency of use of other 
types of covenants pertaining to investment powers (Category 2), fund operation (Category 4) 
and limitation of liability (Category 5).  The data therefore suggest legally trained fund 
managers are more sensitive to specifying rules pertaining to their daily activities of 
investment selection and investment decisions, and neither no more nor less sensitive to 
specifying rules for fund operation relative to non-legally trained fund managers.  Note as 
well, we further control for MBA/CFA training and Ph.D. (scientific versus non-scientific) 
training, and do not find significant differences for these other types of training. 
 
 There is some support for H5 regarding the relevant work experience of the fund 
managers in Model 15 (the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level).  The 
economic significance is such that a fund with managers with an average of 30 years relevant 
work experience are 20% more likely to have an extra covenant pertaining to limited liability 
than a fund with managers with an average of 5 years relevant experience.  Note, however, 
that for the first group of covenants pertaining to investment decisions, Model 3 indicates at 
the 10% level of significance more covenants with more work experience (counter to our 
expectations), and the other groups of covenants are unrelated to work experience.  One 
explanation for this result is that it may be that a more relevant variable would be the number 
of prior funds run by the fund managers; however, that variable was intractable for many of 
the funds in our data due to the fact that fund managers derived experience from funds other 
than the group of funds in which they were currently employed.19 
 
 It is noteworthy that a number of control variables indicate a significant influence on 
the use of covenants.  In particular, Table 4 indicates an important relation between fund 
covenants and fund size, industry market-book, and the identity of the fund’s investors.  In 
particular, larger funds have more covenants; for example, for the third category of covenants 
                                                 
     18 However, for Category 1 in Model 3 the inclusion of the additional right-hand-side variables 
gives rise to a statistically insignificant coefficient for legally trained fund managers, unlike Models 1 
and 2. 
     19 Also, a manager may create a special purpose vehicle for the management of a specific fund, 
albeit for all intents and purpose that vehicle comprises managers who have managed other funds 
together before.  Proxies for the number of prior funds run by the fund itself did not yield materially 
different results. 
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on types of investment, an increase in funds raised from US$90 to US$100 million increases 
the probability of an extra covenant on types of investment by about 0.2%, and an increase 
from US$10 to US$20 million increases the probability of an extra covenant by about 2% in 
Model 9.  Funds that operate in industries with higher market/book ratios have more 
covenants; for example, for the third category of covenants on types of investment, an 
increase in the average industry market/book ratio of investee companies from 2 to 3 
increases the probability of an extra covenant on types of investment by about 4%, and an 
increase from 1 to 2 increases the probability of an extra covenant by about 6% in Model 9.  It 
is also noteworthy that in times of stronger market conditions, institutional investors are more 
likely to grant limited liability protection to fund managers (see, Models 14 and 15); an 
increase in the MSCI index return from 15% to 20% in the year prior to fundraising increases 
the probability of an extra limited liability clause by 0.7%, and an increase from 5% to 10% in 
the year prior to fundraising increases the probability of an extra limited liability clause by 
0.8%.  Overall, therefore, a number of economic factors influence the frequency of use of 
covenants alongside the influence of the legal environment and the influence of the lawyers as 
identified above. 
 
5. Limitations, Alternate Explanations and Future Research 
 
 This paper introduced the first international dataset on private investment fund 
covenants from non-US funds.  Private investment fund covenants are private contractual 
details that are not widely disclosed, and in fact highly confidential.  In short, while the data 
obtained in this paper are new and unique and extremely difficult to obtain from private 
investment funds, there are of course limitations in the number of observations.  Further work 
could consider expanding the data in terms of the number of countries and funds, as well as 
possibly for different time periods.  Nevertheless, as we have discussed in the paper, we do 
not have any reason to believe there are biases with regard to sample selection in the data we 
were able to obtain. 
 
 It is noteworthy that we focused on the Legality index (Berkowitz et al., 2003), which 
is a weighted average of a number of different legal indices from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).  
A limited number of degrees of freedom prevented inclusion of each subcomponent of the 
Legality index separately.  As well, the components of the Legality index themselves are very 
highly correlated, so collinearity problems prevent simultaneous inclusion of these different 
variables.  As well, the GNP per capita in each country is highly correlated with the Legality 
index, so it could not be included as a separate variable.  While the use of these different 
variables did not material changes the inferences drawn from the available data, further work 
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with additional data and/or different countries might shed light on the issue of which specific 
legal index is most pertinent to venture capital fund structures.  As well, while as yet there is 
no particular theory that would lead one to prefer one legal index over another (or prefer one 
legal index to the exclusion of another index), further theoretical work might shed additional 
light on these issues in relation to private investment fund structures, and covenants more 
generally (in the spirit of McCahery and Vermeulen, 2004). 
 
 International differences in fund covenants are one aspect of international differences 
in fund structures.  Further research might also explore international differences in 
compensation arrangements and investment strategies (in the spirit of Mayer et al., 2004, for 
example).  Numerous related issues on how and why fund structures differ across countries 
could be considered, as well as the relation between fund structures (as per the covenants 
studied herein) and contractual arrangements between private investment funds and their 
investee entrepreneurial firms.  This type of research would likely better help us to better 
understand why some private equity and venture capital markets are comparatively more 




 This paper analysed the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by 
institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas 
pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations, 
and limitations on liability.  We introduced a new dataset hand-collected from 50 funds from 
17 countries including developed and emerging markets (Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cayman 
Islands, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherland Antilles, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK and the US.).  Our 
primary hypotheses considered the role of law versus lawyers in the writing of covenants in 
contracts establishing private investment funds.  Numerous control variables in the new and 
detailed data were considered in testing the hypotheses developed herein. 
 
 The data indicated a statistically significant positive relation between the quality of a 
country’s laws and the number of covenants pertaining to fund operations (such as the sale of 
fund interests, restrictions on fundraising, and matters pertaining to public disclosure).  An 
increase in the Legality index from 20 to 21 (a typical improvement among developed 
nations) increases the probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation by 
approximately 1%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 (a typical improvement among 
emerging markets) increases the probability of an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation 
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by approximately 2%.  The data further indicate that civil law countries are approximately 6% 
more likely to have covenants pertaining to the types of investment; however, the 
common/civil law differences were not notable for any other type of covenant. 
 
 The data further indicated an important role for the presence of legally trained fund 
managers in influencing the number of fund covenants.  An increase in one fund manager of 
five with legal training increases the probability of additional covenants pertaining both to 
investment decisions (such as the size of any single investment and co-investment) and types 
of investment (in different asset classes) by approximately 10%.  Taken together, therefore, 
while law and lawyers are both important, the data indicated that the presence of lawyers has 
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Table 1.  Definition of Variables 
This table defines the variables considered in this paper.  Summary statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Variable Description 
Restrictive Covenants  
Investment Decisions 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for each of 6 questions regarding the restrictions placed upon fund managers relating to investment 
decisions in carrying out their duties as manager of the fund.  Such restrictions include restrictions on size of investment (either in dollar value or 
percentage of fund capital) on any one investee firm or portfolio company, restrictions on use of debt instruments, restrictions on co-investment by 
another fund managed by the fund manager, restrictions on reinvestment of capital gains and restrictions on the fund manager making investment 
decisions independently, without fund input.   
Investment Powers 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the 5 questions regarding the restrictions placed upon fund managers in their carrying out their 
duties as General Partner or most active shareholder of a fund company. Such restrictions include restrictions against the fund manager investing in 
any of the investee firms, restrictions on the sale of fund interest by the fund manager, and restrictions on investment principal additions to the fund 
manager.  The presence of key person provisions regarding the fund manager, and any other important restrictions governing the actions of the 
fund manager in his capacity as General partner or most active fund shareholder is also indicated. 
Types of Investments 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the 7 questions regarding the restrictions placed upon fund managers in their making specific 
types of investments. Such restrictions include restrictions on making investments in other investment funds, restrictions on follow-on investments 
in an investee firm of which another fund managed by the fund manager has an interest,  restrictions on investments in public listed securities, 
restrictions on investments in leveraged buyouts, restrictions on investments in foreign securities,  and restrictions on bridge financing. The 
presence of a minimum percentage of domestic investments is also indicated..   
Fund Operation 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the 4 questions regarding the restrictions placed upon fund managers in their administrative 
operation of the fund. Such restrictions include restrictions on sale of fund interest by any investor, restrictions on the fund manager raising new 
funds, and  restrictions on public disclosure of fund matters. The presence of a no-fault divorce provision that allows fund investors to remove the 
fund manager without cause is also indicated. 
Manager Liability Limited 
The sum of dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the 3 questions regarding the limitation of liability of the fund manager. Limitation of liability 
includes in the event of disappointing returns from investments made, failure to invest committed funds within the agreed investment period, and 
mismanagement of funds. 
Sum of all covenants (excl. Limited 
Liability) 
Sum of all covenants deemed to restrict fund manager actions as General Partners or most active shareholder, and fund manager investment 
powers.  
Legal and Market Conditions  
Country Legality Index 
Weighted average of following factors (based on Berkowitz et al., 2003): civil versus common law systems, efficiency of judicial system, rule of 
law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights (as per La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  Where the weighted 
average is not available, especially for less developed countries,  an approximate index  isderived by multiplying  the country’s GNP per 
population with a constant variable obtained by carrying out a regression of the legality indices available.  Higher numbers indicate 'better' legal 
systems.   The log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Common Law Country A dummy variable equal to 1 for a fund organized within a common law jurisdiction 
MSCI Index 
 The country-specific MSCI Index taken for the year prior to that when fund raising commenced . The year prior to fund raising is deemed to be 
most relevant as decisions to invest in private equity by institutional investors will be based on available economic indicators.    The log of 
(1+MSCI) is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Vintage Year of Fund The year fund raising commences 
Outbound offshore 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for a fund located offshore that obtains its capital from investors from a certain jurisdiction but fund investments are 
made primarily in assets other than in the jurisdiction of the fund and the fund investors. With reference to United States jurisdictional boundaries, 
a fund will be considered to be an outbound offshore fund if it obtains capital from United States investors, but it invests outside the United States. 
Inbound offshore 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for a fund located offshore that obtains its capital from investors from various jurisdictions but fund investments are 
made primarily in assets in a certain jurisdiction. With reference to United States jurisdictional boundaries, an inbound offshore fund will be a fund 
located offshore which invests primarily in assets within the United States yet obtains its capital from non-United States investors. 
Fund Manager Characteristics  
Percentage of Legally Trained Fund 
Managers Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who are legally trained, or are qualified as lawyers 
Percentage of MBA/CFA Trained Fund 
Managers Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained an MBA or CFA qualifications 
Percentage of PhD (Science) Trained 
Fund Managers Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained a PhD in a science based discipline 
Percentage of PhD (Non-Science) 
Trained Fund Managers Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained a PhD in a non-science based discipline 
Average # Years of Relevant Work 
Experience of Principal Fund Managers 
Average number of years relevant work experience of principal fund managers at the time of fund raising.  The log of this variable is used in the 
empirics to account for a diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Fund Characteristics  
Funds Raised 
The fund size, or amount of funds raised in US Dollar. Where the amount is provided in a local currency, an exchange rate as at December 2003 is 
used for conversion of such amounts into US Dollar equivalents.  The log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing effect 
with larger numbers. 
Bank Institutional Investors The proportion of banks as the fund’s institutional investors 
Government Investors The proportion of government agencies or ministries as institutional investors 
Limited Partnership Funds A dummy variable equal to 1 for the fund being organized as a limited partnership 
Industry Market / Book 
The industry market/book ratio of the industries for which the fund has invested in. The industry market/book ratio of 5 general categories, 
Biotechnology and  Medical,  Communications and Internet, Computers and Electronics,  Manufacturing and others, is obtained by averaging the 
total book value of specific industries falling within the general categories.  The log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a 
diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Early Stage Investee Focus 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for funds which indicate a focus on financing provided  to firms in their early / expansion stages of development (not 
late stages or buyout stages).  More specific stages of focus were not tractable due to international differences in the definition of stage focus, as 
well as style drift that is often observed among different stages of development. 
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Table 2.  Summary of the Data 
This table summarizes the funds in the data based on the country in which the fund was formed.  The average values of each category per country are reported. 
  Country of Fund Formation 
  














erland UK US 
Number of Funds in Our 
Data 50 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 6 4 8 1 1 2 1 6 8 
Restrictive Covenants                                     
Investment Decisions 3.60 4.00 6.00 4.00 3.50 4.00 3.67 5.00 3.00 4.33 3.00 3.50 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.83 3.75 
Investment Powers 3.62 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 5.00 3.33 1.00 4.00 4.17 5.00 3.38 5.00 3.00 3.50 1.00 3.00 4.38 
Types of Investments 4.30 2.33 6.00 6.00 1.50 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.67 7.00 6.38 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 2.67 4.88 
Fund Operation 2.22 1.67 3.00 4.00 3.50 3.00 1.33 2.00 0.00 1.50 4.00 2.13 3.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.83 3.00 
Manager Liability Limited 1.92 2.67 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.33 2.00 1.75 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.83 1.88 
Sum of all covenants (excl. 
Limited Liability) 13.74 11.00 18.00 18.00 10.50 16.00 11.33 12.00 10.00 13.67 19.00 15.38 17.00 12.00 10.00 5.00 10.33 16.00 
Legal and Market 
Conditions                                    
Country Legality Index 19.82 20.82 14.09 21.13 20.41 21.49 20.44 17.23 21.91 16.67 21.67 21.67 21.55 8.51 14.51 21.91 20.41 20.85 
Common Law Country   No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
MSCI Index 0.11 0.19 0.62 -0.14 0.01 1.19 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.20 -0.63 0.17 -0.08 0.14 0.07 
Vintage Year of Fund 2000 1999.3 2000.0 2004.0 2000.0 1999.0 1998.0 2002.0 1997.0 2001.5 2000.3 1997.6 2003.0 1998.0 2001.0 2000.0 2000.5 2000.9 
Outbound offshore 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.38 
Inbound offshore 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.13 
Fund Manager 
Characteristics                                    
Percentage of Legally 
Trained Fund Managers 5.96 8.33 20.00 33.00 0.00 5.00 3.33 25.00 5.00 4.17 0.00 12.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 1.88 
Percentage of MBA/CFA 
Trained Fund Managers 75.40 58.33 80.00 67.00 90.00 80.00 86.67 25.00 80.00 78.33 80.00 63.75 80.00 50.00 83.50 70.00 90.00 77.00 
Percentage of PhD 
(Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
8.80 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.33 0.00 5.00 5.83 5.00 9.38 5.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 9.38 
Percentage of PhD (Non-
Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
12.56 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 6.67 0.00 10.00 10.00 30.00 15.63 10.00 0.00 0.00 30.00 3.33 15.38 
Average # Years of 
Relevant Work Experience 
of Principal Fund Managers 
14.07 11.33 14.00 18.00 11.00 18.00 11.67 20.00 10.00 14.75 14.00 12.13 20.00 10.00 7.00 15.00 15.67 17.25 
Fund Characteristics                                    
Funds Raised 1.04E+08 1.43E+08 1.00E+07 6.79E+07 8.43E+07 3.46E+07 1.49E+08 2.66E+08 3.60E+07 3.21E+07 3.04E+08 4.66E+07 2.00E+07 2.30E+07 2.81E+07 2.63E+05 1.63E+08 1.10E+08 
Bank Institutional Investors 0.16 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.45 0.60 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.08 
Government Investors 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.42 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.25 0.22 0.40 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.08 
Limited Partnership Funds 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 
Industry Market / Book 4.04 3.89 4.84 2.72 2.87 2.48 3.75 2.70 4.75 4.42 4.82 3.66 5.79 6.19 5.03 4.10 4.14 3.71 





Table 3.  Correlations 
This table presents correlations across the variables defined in Table 1.  Correlations significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold and underline font. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Investment Decision Covenants 1.00                                                 
(2) Investment Power Covenants 0.33 1.00                                               
(3) Types of Investment Covenants 0.24 0.26 1.00                                             
(4) Fund Operation Covenants 0.08 0.47 0.37 1.00                                           
(5) Limitation of Liability Covenants 0.52 0.52 0.04 0.19 1.00                                         
(6) Sum of All Covenants (excl. liability) 0.56 0.71 0.77 0.68 0.41 1.00                                       
(7) Log (Legality) -0.12 0.08 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.13 1.00                                     
(8) Common Law 0.01 0.10 -0.28 0.04 0.13 -0.08 -0.13 1.00                                   
(9) Log (1+MSCI) 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.36 0.07 0.43 -0.08 1.00                                 
(10) GNP / Capita -0.19 -0.06 0.05 0.18 -0.17 0.00 0.77 -0.33 0.12 1.00                               
(11) Year of Fund Formation 0.03 0.19 -0.08 0.13 0.25 0.08 -0.07 0.32 -0.01 -0.16 1.00                             
(12) Outbound Offshore Fund -0.35 0.25 0.04 0.38 -0.13 0.12 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.09 0.03 1.00                           
(13) Inbound Offshore Fund -0.22 0.01 -0.34 0.12 0.03 -0.19 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.18 1.00                         
(14) Percentage Legal Trained Fund Managers 0.33 -0.06 0.24 -0.06 0.06 0.18 0.05 -0.19 -0.11 0.01 0.12 -0.33 -0.19 1.00                       
(15) Percentage MBA Trained Fund Managers -0.19 0.05 -0.28 -0.08 -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.33 0.19 -0.05 0.00 0.24 0.07 -0.27 1.00                     
(16) Percentage Phd (NonScience) Trained Fund Managers 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.10 -0.01 0.24 0.30 -0.31 -0.06 0.29 -0.04 0.10 -0.27 0.14 -0.30 1.00                   
(17) Percentage Phd (Science) Trained Fund Managers -0.19 0.03 -0.13 0.03 -0.17 -0.10 -0.17 -0.14 -0.31 -0.02 -0.03 0.22 0.21 0.06 -0.19 0.10 1.00                 
(18) Log (Years Relevant Work Experience) 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.30 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.20 0.09 -0.14 1.00               
(19) Log (Funds Raised) -0.10 0.10 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.36 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.12 -0.16 0.01 1.00             
(20) Bank Institutional Investors -0.12 -0.25 -0.13 -0.28 0.12 -0.27 0.07 -0.31 0.14 0.11 -0.07 -0.22 -0.15 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.28 1.00           
(21) Government Investors 0.17 0.17 0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.18 -0.19 0.04 -0.15 -0.30 0.00 -0.16 0.13 0.05 -0.34 -0.09 0.07 -0.03 -0.25 -0.23 1.00         
(22) Pension Investors 0.01 -0.21 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.20 0.15 -0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 0.24 -0.10 -0.15 1.00       
(23) Endowment Investors -0.04 0.18 0.24 0.29 -0.01 0.26 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.20 -0.18 0.45 0.03 -0.07 0.17 0.16 -0.18 0.07 0.40 -0.18 -0.14 0.21 1.00     
(24) Limited Partnership Fund -0.13 0.25 0.05 0.37 0.21 0.18 0.33 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.11 0.47 0.14 -0.12 0.28 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.40 -0.24 -0.20 0.20 0.54 1.00   
(25) Log (Industry Market / Book) -0.03 0.13 0.34 0.01 -0.04 0.21 -0.25 -0.03 -0.24 -0.21 0.06 0.21 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 0.21 0.17 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.05 
-
0.12 1.00 












Table 4. Regression Analyses 
This table presents OLS and ordered logit regressions of the number of contractual covenants used to govern the operation of private investment funds.  Ordered logit estimates are used for Models 1-15 where the dependent variable has up to 7 different 
values; for Models 16-18, the dependent variable can take up to 26 different values, hence ordered logits cannot be used and OLS is used.  The sample comprises 50 funds from 17 countries in Australasia, Europe, and North and South America.  The 
variables are as defined in Table 1.  White's (1980) HCCME is used in each regression.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
LHS Variable: Sum of Covenants for Investment Decisions LHS Variable: Sum of Covenants for Investment Powers 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 4.752 1.568 6.762 1.971** 110.821 1.116 3.058 -0.403 -1.432 -0.424 -112.821 -1.121 
Legal and Market Conditions                         
Log (Country Legality Index) -0.880 -0.934 -1.427 -1.338 -1.652 -1.379 0.938 0.843 0.713 0.692 0.757 0.660 
Common Law Country     0.202 0.585 -0.016 -0.043     0.035 0.097 0.074 0.183 
Log (1+MSCI)     1.273 1.870* 0.712 0.990     0.432 0.637 0.569 0.790 
Vintage Year of Fund         -0.053 -1.064         0.056 1.110 
Outbound Offshore Fund         -1.099 -2.095**         0.401 0.777 
Inbound Offshore Fund         -0.576 -1.089         -0.456 -0.816 
Fund Manager Characteristics                         
Percentage of Legally Trained Fund Managers 0.037 2.455*** 0.041 2.549** 0.027 1.466 0.015 -0.782 -0.008 -0.515 -0.009 -0.488 
Percentage of MBA/CFA Trained Fund Managers     -0.009 -0.960         0.004 0.430     
Percentage  of PhD (Science) Trained Fund 
Managers         -0.004 -0.363         0.004 0.334 
Log (Average # Years of Relevant Work Experience 
of Principal Fund Managers)         0.815 1.758*         -0.014 -0.028 
Fund Characteristics                         
Log (Funds Raised) -0.035 -0.368 -0.033 -0.322 0.200 1.285 0.099 0.680 0.136 1.253 -0.019 -0.120 
Bank Institutional Investors     -0.398 -0.588 -1.232 -1.547     -1.145 -1.659* -0.746 -0.936 
Government Investors     0.449 0.561 0.638 0.796     0.767 0.977 1.030 1.311 
Limited Partnership Funds         0.005 0.011         0.269 0.614 
Log (Industry Market / Book) -0.057 -0.112 0.056 0.107 0.036 0.057 0.524 1.122 0.620 1.152 0.570 0.872 
Early Stage Investee Focus         0.258 0.550         -0.279 -0.553 
Ordered Logit Cut-off Parameters                         
µ1 0.306 1.316 0.320 1.324 0.309 1.264 0.208 4.729*** 1.088 4.916*** 1.051 4.644*** 
µ2 1.073 5.115*** 1.121 5.113*** 1.172 4.722*** 0.191 7.083*** 1.498 7.498*** 1.477 7.182*** 
µ3 2.179 11.565*** 2.297 11.724*** 2.570 11.952*** 0.183 9.615*** 1.939 10.314*** 1.956 10.123*** 
µ4 2.918 14.269*** 3.069 14.545*** 3.422 15.441*** 0.200 11.717*** 2.553 12.411*** 2.609 12.203*** 
µ5 3.562 13.457*** 3.751 13.602*** 4.152 14.262***             
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.075 0.139 0.019 0.053 0.075 
LogLikelihood -77.875 -75.197 -70.043 -75.447 -72.848 -71.144 
Chi-Squared 6.922 12.278 22.588* 2.886 8.084 11.493 
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Table 4. Regression Analyses (Continued) 
LHS Variable: Sum of Covenants for Types of Investment LHS Variable: Sum of Covenants for Fund Operations 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12   
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -5.150 -1.709* -4.488 -1.327 135.031 1.286 -5.309 -1.736* -5.900 -1.712* -113.999 -1.077 
Legal and Market Conditions                         
Log (Country Legality Index) 1.317 1.419 1.420 1.368 1.772 1.522 1.685 1.791* 2.301 2.163** 2.284 1.932* 
Common Law Country     -0.750 -2.074** -0.703 -1.786*     -0.277 -0.725 -0.318 -0.739 
Log (1+MSCI Index)     0.302 0.463 -0.016 -0.023     -0.279 -0.409 -0.135 -0.186 
Vintage Year of Fund         -0.071 -1.348         0.054 1.019 
Outbound Offshore Fund         -0.041 -0.078         0.407 0.764 
Inbound Offshore Fund         -1.424 -2.599***         -0.258 -0.471 
Fund Manager Characteristics                         
Percentage of Legally Trained Fund Managers 0.042 2.434** 0.035 1.895* 0.039 1.834* -0.004 -0.236 -0.013 -0.797 -0.003 -0.170 
Percentage of MBA/CFA Trained Fund Managers     -0.008 -0.858         -0.010 -1.028     
Percentage of PhD (Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
        -0.008 -0.711         0.008 0.698 
Log (Average # Years of Relevant Work Experience 
of Principal Fund Managers)         0.236 0.506         -0.115 -0.233 
Fund Characteristics                         
Log (Funds Raised) 0.171 1.761* 0.279 2.593*** 0.403 2.564** 0.241 2.431** 0.394 3.492*** 0.234 1.479 
Bank Institutional Investors     -1.524 -2.221** -1.825 -2.311**     -2.700 -3.268*** -2.570 -2.679*** 
Government Investors     1.064 1.171 1.798 1.800*     0.151 0.186 0.766 0.971 
Limited Partnership Funds         0.042 0.092         0.042 0.095 
Log (Industry Market / Book) 1.803 3.540*** 1.817 3.466*** 1.952 3.164*** 0.469 0.907 0.278 0.512 0.484 0.762 
Early Stage Investee Focus         0.106 0.224         -0.785 -1.644 
Ordered Logit Cut-off Parameters                         
µ1 0.723 3.422*** 0.810 3.519*** 0.932 3.579*** 0.799 4.727*** 0.953 5.055*** 0.955 4.945*** 
µ2 1.018 4.915*** 1.141 5.125*** 1.339 5.398*** 1.267 7.228*** 1.462 7.724*** 1.479 7.475*** 
µ3 1.726 8.957*** 1.913 9.454*** 2.252 10.300*** 2.009 9.146*** 2.314 9.446*** 2.403 9.155*** 
µ4 2.177 11.26*** 2.399 11.823*** 2.803 12.962***             
µ5 2.687 13.132*** 2.977 13.417*** 3.456 14.655***             
µ6 2.893 13.359*** 3.231 13.424*** 3.736 14.544***             
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.147 0.202 0.064 0.155 0.182 
LogLikelihood -87.763 -82.014 -76.757 -74.291 -66.997 -64.867 




Table 4. Regression Analyses (Continued) 
LHS Variable: Sum of Covenants for Limited Liability LHS Variable: Sum of All Types of Covenants (Excl. Limited Liability) 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18   
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -0.027 -0.008 0.494 0.120 -154.758 -1.110 -7.256 -0.935 -2.703 -0.367 91.172 0.250 
Legal and Market Conditions                         
Log (Country Legality Index) 0.500 0.493 0.178 0.138 -1.573 -1.115 4.104 1.752* 3.329 1.341 3.364 1.119 
Common Law Country     0.542 1.351 -0.019 -0.042     -0.859 -0.857 -0.816 -0.761 
Log (1+MSCI Index)     2.039 2.501** 1.508 1.772*     2.244 1.184 1.485 0.742 
Vintage Year of Fund         0.079 1.132         -0.049 -0.269 
Outbound Offshore Fund         -0.927 -1.586         -0.472 -0.216 
Inbound Offshore Fund         0.212 0.358         -3.146 -1.164 
Fund Manager Characteristics                         
Percentage of Legally Trained Fund Managers 0.001 0.031 0.009 0.513 -0.004 -0.195 0.102 3.020*** 0.086 2.629*** 0.074 1.720* 
Percentage of MBA/CFA Trained Fund Managers     -0.005 -0.533         -0.025 -0.969     
Percentage of PhD (Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
        -0.003 -0.256         -0.001 -0.031 
Log (Average # Years of Relevant Work Experience 
of Principal Fund Managers)         1.059 1.817*         0.951 0.703 
Fund Characteristics                         
Log (Funds Raised) 0.0242 0.236 -0.026 -0.225 -0.205 -1.157 0.637 1.508 0.964 2.283** 0.982 1.675* 
Bank Institutional Investors     1.136 1.485 1.701 1.785*     -6.719 -2.987*** -7.004 -2.680*** 
Government Investors     1.173 1.340 1.669 1.847*     2.955 1.250 4.685 1.676* 
Limited Partnership Funds         1.174 2.241**         0.403 0.274 
Log (Industry Market / Book) -0.406 -0.747 -0.164 -0.286 0.112 0.155 4.294 2.245** 3.850 2.194** 3.849 1.904* 
Early Stage Investee Focus         -0.599 -1.085         -0.636 -0.468 
Ordered Logit Cut-off Parameters                         
µ1 0.078 1.043 0.096 1.048 0.104 1.039             
µ2 1.656 6.836*** 1.913 6.626*** 2.200 6.390***             
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.011 0.119 0.226 0.102 0.209 0.146 
LogLikelihood -51.721 -46.084 -40.488 -139.996 -133.885 -131.740 
Akaike Information Criterion --- --- --- 5.800 5.755 5.910 
Chi-Squared / F-Statistic 1.197 12.471 23.663* 2.39* 2.44** 1.56 
 
